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Abstract 
Domestic violence is New Zealand’s most significant human rights failing according to the 
2014 Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights. Yet, there is no indication in legislation or 
policy that domestic violence is considered a human rights issue in New Zealand. The Domestic 
Violence Act 1995 is merely ordinary law. In this paper I consider whether a human rights 
approach to domestic violence would provide greater redress for vulnerable women and 
children in New Zealand. Ultimately it is argued that domestic violence should be framed as a 
human rights approach. This could be by recognising a right to be free from domestic violence 
within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 or by inserting a rights framework provision 
into the Domestic Violence Act. However, this is no simple solution to domestic violence. This 
is because it seems that human rights are considered mere political claims in New Zealand and 
because there is a clear reluctance to require the state to take positive action to prevent human 
rights abuses. Such culture may undermine the effectiveness of a recognised right to be free 
from domestic violence. However, I conclude by arguing that such problems do not outweigh 
the benefits of a human rights approach but merely require careful and sensitive enforcement 
of the right to be free from domestic violence. 
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I Introduction 
“We are looking to empower women. We have the audacity to think that we 
might be able to use the state to help do it.” – Catherine MacKinnon1 
This statement by MacKinnon sets the scene for this paper. I explore New Zealand’s human 
rights obligations in regards to protecting and preventing women from domestic violence. This 
is because domestic violence is New Zealand’s most significant human rights failing and 
recognised as such by the international community in the 2014 Universal Periodic Review on 
Human Rights (UPR). Yet, it seems that New Zealand fails to recognise domestic violence as 
a human rights issue, as a matter of law. The Domestic Violence Act 1995, our primary 
mechanism for addressing domestic violence, is mere ordinary law. The pertinent question for 
this paper is whether framing domestic violence as a legal human rights issue and therefore 
recognising a right to be free from domestic violence would provide effective and appropriate 
redress for those most vulnerable.  
Ultimately it is argued that New Zealand should recognise a right to be free from domestic 
violence. This could be done by introducing a right to be free from domestic violence into the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 or the Human Rights Act 1993 or by inserting a provision within the 
Domestic Violence Act. Recognising a right to be free from domestic violence will highlight 
the seriousness of this social problem and emphasise the importance in allocating state 
resources to address it. However, I identify two problems with recognising a right to be free 
from domestic violence.  
First, it is suggested that human rights lack power in New Zealand because it seems that New 
Zealand’s human rights culture tends to view human rights as political rights rather than legal 
rights. I attempt to gain some indication of New Zealand’s rights culture by considering 
evidence of culture from recent cases, statements by Parliament and the Executive and 
academic discourse. It is suggested that such evidence indicates a political rights culture. Such 
dichotomy, whether rights are legal or political, comes from Professor Griffith’s theory that 
human rights are mere political claims by individuals or groups and are not legal causes of 
action.  
Secondly, recognising a human right to be free from domestic violence within legislation would 
impose positive obligations on the state to enforce such right. This may not be appropriate as 
                                                     
1 As cited in Leigh Goodmark A Troubled Marriage: Domestic Violence and the Legal System (New York 
University Press, New York, 2012) at 11. 
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there is a clear reluctance to recognise positive obligations to prevent economic, social and 
cultural rights abuses in New Zealand, and, positive state action may not be the most 
appropriate or effective means to address domestic violence.  
Nonetheless, I conclude by arguing that such problems with a human rights approach to 
domestic violence do not outweigh the importance of recognising a right to be free from such 
violence. Although a human rights approach to domestic violence is no simple solution and 
will require careful and sensitive application New Zealand has no excuse for refusing to 
recognise and publically label domestic violence as what it is, our most significant human rights 
abuse. 
Finally a note on scope; I am concerned with domestic violence towards women. Although 
there are certainly cases of domestic violence directed towards men, women make up the 
majority of domestic violence victims. In 2015, 89 percent of applicants for protection orders 
were women and 88 percent of respondents named in protection order applications were male.2 
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse stated that the most critical factor for 
determining whether or not someone would use violence or be a victim of violence was 
gender.3 Statistics such as these are consistent with feminist thinking that “subjugation to men 
defines what it is to be a woman.”4 Such thinking will be expanded on later in regards to the 
value of a human rights approach to domestic violence. The power of a human rights approach 
in reinforcing respect for gender equality is why this paper is confined to domestic violence 
against women.  
II New Zealand’s Most Significant Human Rights Failing 
In this part I outline in brief the issue of domestic violence in New Zealand, the current 
legislative framework addressing domestic violence and whether or not such framework 
establishes domestic violence as a human rights issue. I argue that according to the current 
framework domestic violence is not as a matter of law a human rights issue in New Zealand.  
                                                     
2 New Zealand Family Violence Clearing House “Violence Against Women” (2015) < nzfvc.org.nz>. Also see 
Ministry of Justice “The nature and dynamics of family violence across population groups” 
<www.justice.govt.nz>. 
3 New Zealand Family Violence Clearing House “Respect position statement: gender and domestic violence” < 
nzfvc.org.nz>. Also see Ministry of Justice “The nature and dynamics of family violence across population 
groups” <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
4 Goodmark, above n 1, at 10.  
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New Zealand has one of the highest rates of domestic violence of the developed world.5 Over 
half of all reported crime in New Zealand is domestic violence related with police responding 
to over 95 000 domestic violence related incidents each year.6 This is 200 domestic violence 
call outs each day or one domestic violence call out every five to seven minutes.7 In 2012 and 
2013 Women’s Refuge, New Zealand’s primary family violence response agency, provided 
76,000 safe beds for women and children who felt unsafe in their own homes.8 On average, 
this was 209 persons each day that sought safety through Women’s Refuge.9 It is important to 
note that Women’s refuge only has capacity for the most serious cases of abuse. Most often 
this is where children are at risk of violence. Such statistics are shocking yet they account for 
only 18 percent of all domestic violence incidents, a fraction of all domestic violence that 
occurs in New Zealand. 10   
The Domestic Violence Act is New Zealand’s primary mechanism for addressing domestic 
violence. It was enacted in response to increased public outcry regarding domestic violence. 
Accordingly, the Domestic Violence Act is premised on the belief that domestic violence in all 
forms is unacceptable behaviour therefore domestic violence is defined broadly.11 It includes 
physical, sexual and psychological abuse.12 This incorporates a wide range of behaviour which 
reflects the wide range of domestic violence apparent in New Zealand society. For example, 
Women’s Refuge found that 64 percent of clients reported psychological abuse, 49 percent 
reported physical abuse, 23 percent reported financial abuse, 21 percent reported harassment 
and stalking, 12 percent reported spiritual abuse, 12 percent reported sexual abuse and 11 
percent report that weapons were used.13 In many cases more than one type of abuse was 
reported.14  
At the centre of the Domestic Violence Act is the protection order. Such remedy is hoped to 
prevent future violence. To obtain a protection order an applicant must satisfy three elements. 
                                                     
5 NZPA “NZ worst for domestic violence-UN report” Stuff National (New Zealand, 24 July 2011). 
6 Denise Wilson and Melinda Webber The People’s Blueprint (The Glenn Inquiry, November 2014) at 16. 
7 National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges “New Zealand Domestic Violence Statistics” 
<womensrefuge.org.nz>. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Wilson and Webber, The People’s Blueprint, at 5, and National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges 
“New Zealand Domestic Violence Statistics” <womensrefuge.org.nz>.  
11 Section 5 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
12 Section 3. 
13 National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges “New Zealand Domestic Violence Statistics” 
<womensrefuge.org.nz>. 
14 Ibid.  
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First, she must be in a domestic relationship with the perpetrator of the violence, again this is 
defined broadly and is satisfied by any close personal relationship, for example, flat mates.15 
Secondly, there must be domestic violence and thirdly, a protection order must be necessary.16 
To determine whether or not a protection order is necessary the court takes into account all 
relevant factors including the subjective fears of the victim.17 The protection order is a civil 
order within the jurisdiction of the Family Court and contravention of or failure to comply with 
protection order conditions is a criminal offence within the jurisdiction of the District Court.18 
In 2014, 3124 protection orders were granted to victims of domestic violence.19 This was 61 
percent of all protection orders applied for.20 Additionally, 3149 persons were convicted and 
sentenced for breach of a protection order.21 
A No Right to be Free from Domestic Violence in New Zealand Law 
The framework established by the Domestic Violence Act is mere ordinary law. The Domestic 
Violence Act does not establish domestic violence as a human rights abuse and neither the Act 
nor leading domestic violence cases utilise human rights rhetoric. For example, the Domestic 
Violence Act does not incorporate a provision affirming that freedom from domestic violence 
is a recognised human right. This means that the Domestic Violence Act is equivalent in status 
to legislation such as the Crimes Act 1961. It is not equivalent to constitutional human rights 
statutes like the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act or the Human Rights Act. As well, neither the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act nor the Human Rights Act specifically encapsulate a right to 
be free from domestic violence. 
Further, the Domestic Violence Act does not affirm New Zealand’s commitment to freedom 
from domestic violence under The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). CEDAW is the primary international treaty governing violence against 
women and encapsulates related human rights. CEDAW does not address domestic violence 
explicitly however the CEDAW committee in General Resolution 19 identified gender-based 
violence as a form of discrimination in serious opposition to a women’s human rights.22 New 
                                                     
15 Section 4 Domestic Violence Act. 
16 Section 14. 
17 Surrey v Surrey [2008] NZCA 565 2 NZLR 581 at [96]-[104]. 
18 Section 49 Domestic Violence Act. 
19 New Zealand Family Violence Clearing House “Violence Against Women” (2015) < nzfvc.org.nz>. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  
22 J Fenrich and J Contesse “It’s Not Ok: New Zealand’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women” (2008) 
1(1) Crowley Mission Reports 4 at 8. 
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Zealand has signed and ratified CEDAW however has failed to incorporate it directly into 
domestic legislation. Regardless, it is generally accepted that New Zealand’s domestic violence 
policy meets CEDAW obligations.23 The Optional Protocol to CEDAW enables rights 
violations to be taken before the CEDAW committee. Again, New Zealand has ratified this 
provision but failed to utilise it as a protection.24 CEDAW’s status means that the right to be 
free from domestic violence per CEDAW is not translated directly into New Zealand law. This 
is because New Zealand has a dual legal system.25 Traditionally, international obligations have 
been unenforceable in New Zealand unless incorporated into domestic legislation.26  
Absence of a rights approach to domestic violence within the legislative framework reflects the 
historical attitude that domestic violence is a private affair between husband and wife and 
should not be dealt with by the state. According to Goodmark domestic violence was deemed 
“an extension of the husband’s right to control the behaviour of his wife, to be handled within 
the confines of the home”27 Enacting domestic violence legislation (in New Zealand, the 
Domestic Protection Act 1982 and then the Domestic Violence Act 1995) and recognising that 
“public systems and institutions have a responsibility to address abuse was a radical 
development of the law as state intervention runs counter to the attitude that domestic violence 
is a private matter.”28 Understanding this underlying attitude, an attitude that is arguably still 
prevalent among families in New Zealand today, helps one to understand why the New Zealand 
state may be reluctant to frame domestic violence as a human right within either the Domestic 
Violence Act or constitutional human rights statutes. Recognising a right to be free from 
domestic violence within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, for example, would be a further 
encroach into the privacy of families as it would mandate state responsibility and intervention 
in domestic violence situations. This will be discussed later in regards to positive obligations.  
                                                     
23 Fenrich and Contesse, above n 22, t 8. 
24 United Nations Women “Text of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women” <www.un.org/womenwatch/>. Also see Susan Deller Ross Women’s Human 
Rights: The International and Comparative Law Casebook (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 
2008) at ch 369. 
25 Sir Kenneth Keith “The Application of International Human Rights Law in New Zealand” (1997) 32 (3) 
Texas International Law Journal 401 at 406. 
26 At 406. Also see Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) per Cooke J at 224. However, 
note that the dualist approach to international law is no longer definitive. Courts are arguably becoming more 
willing to interpret legislation consistently with international obligations despite non-incorporation, this may be 
through application of the presumption of consistency. For example, see Tavita v Minister of Immigration 
[1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA). There may be greater scope nowadays for CEDAW to have direct influence in 
domestic violence cases. However, I have not yet come across a domestic violence case that directly discusses 
an approach consistent with the requirements in CEDAW.  
27 Goodmark, above n 1, at 1.  
28 At 1. 
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Nevertheless, perhaps the right to be free from domestic violence underlies the current 
legislative framework. Geiringer and Palmer argue that human rights are protected in “manifold 
ways throughout the breadth of statute and common law.” For example, Geiringer and Palmer 
draw attention to the criminalisation of murder under ss 167-168 of the Crimes Act 1961 and 
suggest that despite being an ordinary criminal provision these sections are one of the ways in 
which the state recognises and protects the right to life.29  
If this line of reasoning is followed, it could be argued that prohibiting violence towards women 
in the Domestic Violence Act 1995 is sufficient to recognise a right to be free from domestic 
violence. This argument is flawed. “Not all wrongs constitute violations of rights.”30 There 
must be a distinction between ordinary legal (criminal) wrongs and breach of human rights.31 
Further, Geiringer and Palmer’s example of murder relates to an already existing right. The 
law against murder enforces the right to life per s 8 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
There is no corresponding right to be free from domestic violence in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, therefore there is no existing rights foundation for the provisions in the Domestic 
Violence Act. 
Accordingly, this shows that domestic violence is not, as a matter of law, considered a human 
rights issue in New Zealand. Despite this, the UPR recommendations are premised on domestic 
violence being considered a human rights issue. Of 155 recommendations more than 20 
specifically related to domestic violence.32 In particular, the UPR drew attention to New 
Zealand’s lack of national strategy and policy to combat domestic violence, New Zealand’s 
lack of monitoring and evaluation of domestic violence prevention programmes and agencies, 
the lack of empirical data around domestic violence, the lack of human rights training for actors 
involved in domestic violence work and the lack of adequate resources allocated to preventing 
domestic violence.33   
In response to these concerns New Zealand made two comments. First, that New Zealand is 
committed to improving women’s safety from violence and secondly that New Zealand’s 
                                                     
29 Claudia Geiringer and Matthew Palmer, “Human rights and social policy in New Zealand” (2007) 30 Social 
Policy Journal of New Zealand 12 at 14-15. 
30 Joseph Raz “Human Rights without Foundations” (2007) 14 University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
Research paper Series 1 at 13. 
31 At 13. 
32 Ministry of Justice “List of recommendations made during New Zealand’s 2014 Universal Periodic Review” 
(2014) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
33 Ibid. 
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legislative framework already provides comprehensive protection against discrimination.34 It 
could be argued that such response indicates tacit acceptance that domestic violence is a human 
rights issue in New Zealand. Perhaps in the public arena state actors are willing to hint at 
domestic violence being considered a rights issue. In public newspaper articles and press 
releases concerning the UPR recommendations politicians have certainly utilised rights 
language and discussed domestic violence as if it is considered a human rights issue.35 
However, as identified, human rights rhetoric is not present in the current domestic violence 
legal framework. The political discourse does not translate into the legal framework. This may 
be because human rights are considered only political claims in New Zealand. This will be 
expounded later. 
B An Implied Right to be Free from Domestic Violence 
I argue that framing domestic violence as a rights issue would provide greater redress for 
women suffering from domestic violence in New Zealand. The following section addresses 
whether despite absence of explicit language recognising a right to be free from domestic 
violence such right could be read into the current legal framework per ss 8 and 9 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  
It could be argued that the right to be free from violence could be read into the right to life per 
s 8 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. In Lawson v Housing New Zealand the plaintiff 
attempted to argue that the right to life encompassed things “necessary to support and ensure a 
person’s existence such as adequate and affordable housing.”36 The same argument could be 
made in regards to domestic violence. That is, that the right to life extends to a safe and non-
violent state of being. Such approach would be consistent with CEDAW obligations. General 
Resolution 19, noted above, specifically declares that gender-based violence contravenes the 
right to life in CEDAW.37 However, Butler and Butler argue against an extension of s 8 in this 
manner.38 They argue that the s 8 right to life in New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is limited to 
life or death situations.39 Section 8 does not speak to quality of life issues, of which domestic 
                                                     
34 Ministry of Justice “List of recommendations made during New Zealand’s 2014 Universal Periodic Review” 
(2014) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
35 See, NZPA “NZ worst for domestic violence-UN report” Stuff National (New Zealand, 24 July 2011), Stacey 
Kirk “UN concern over violence in NZ” Stuff National (New Zealand, 28 January 2014), Green Party “UN-NZ 
failing on domestic violence and protecting children” (press release, 1 February 2014). 
36 Lawson v New Zealand Housing [1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC).Also see Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A commentary (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) at [9.4.1-9.4.2]. 
37 Fenrich and Contesse, above n 22, at 8. 
38 Butler and Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act above n 36, at [9.4]. 
39 At [9.4]. 
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violence would fall under.40 Butler and Butler state that “inferior housing, poor quality health 
systems, poor criminal law enforcement that leads to vicious but non-fatal attacks, are not 
covered by s 8 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.”41 They argue that s 8 sets a high 
threshold. In Lawson Williams J found that it is unlikely that s 8 can be extended to social and 
economic factors.42 The plaintiff’s right to life did not include the right to basic standard of 
living.43  
William J’s approach is consistent with the deliberate omission of economic, social and cultural 
rights from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.44 The Act incorporates New Zealand’s 
international obligations regarding civil and political rights but it does not incorporate the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR).45 The right to 
be free from violence arguably falls more naturally within the sphere of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Given the distinction between these categories of rights it would be somewhat 
awkward and contrary to parliamentary intent to attempt to interpret the right to life in a civil 
and political context to include the right to be free from domestic violence.  
I am persuaded by this argument, recognising a right to be free from domestic violence within 
New Zealand’s civil and political rights framework goes against parliamentary intent. 
However, such argument is perhaps not as unequivocal as the above section asserts.  Tushnet 
argues that distinguishing civil and political rights from economic, social and cultural rights is 
ingrained in legal and political thinking.46 Yet, he argues that the categorisation of rights in this 
way may stem from a decision about the priority of rights and the associated obligations rather 
than from the substance of rights.47 For example, Opie argues that all rights require the state to 
take positive action, for example, the enactment of legislation, monitoring and enforcement, 
not just civil and political rights.48 Positive obligations will be discussed in greater detail later. 
For now, it is sufficient to note that if Tushnet is correct in arguing that the distinction between 
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights has “collapsed” then a narrow 
                                                     
40 Butler and Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act above n 36, at [9.4]. 
41 At [9.4.1-9.4.2]. 
42 Lawson v Housing New Zealand, above n 36, at 494-495. 
43 At 494-495. Also see discussion in, Joss Opie, “A Case for Including Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990” (2012) 43 VUWLR 471 at 494-495. 
44 Opie, above n 43, at 494-495. 
45 At 494-495. 
46 Mark Tushnet, “Civil and Social Rights” (1991) 25 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1207 at 1213-1217. 
47 At 1213-1217. 
48 Opie, above n 43, at 505. Also see, Stephen Holmes and Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights (WW Norton & 
Company, New York, 1999) at 44. 
Laws 522 Domestic Violence: Just a Matter for the Politicians? Emma Talbot 
 
12 
 
interpretation of s 8 may be incorrect.49 The example of domestic violence shows that the line 
between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights can be blurred. The 
right to life is violated when a woman dies from domestic violence. Arguably it would be 
absurd to hold that the violence be sufficiently serious as to result in death before a human right 
would be considered breached as a matter of law in New Zealand. This argument conflicts with 
the approach to human rights in New Zealand and may indicate, as will be argued, that New 
Zealand should change its current approach to human rights to recognise that the right to be 
free from domestic violence is a valid and legally enforceable human right.  
Regarding s 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, it could be argued that the right to be free 
from domestic violence can be read into the right to be free from cruel or degrading treatment. 
In my view this is a more convincing argument than interpreting s 8 to include freedom from 
domestic violence. Certainly, this argument has been accepted in other jurisdictions. In A v 
United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights held that physical chastisement of a 
child with a wooden cane was sufficiently serious to invoke s 3 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European equivalent to s 9 in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 50  Perhaps it could be argued that similar reasoning should 
apply in New Zealand. Section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that: 
9. Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment – Everyone has the 
right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe 
treatment or punishment.  
Domestic violence arguably falls within this provision. Domestic violence is treatment. 
Although there is not yet any case law on the precise meaning of “treatment” per s 9, Butler 
and Butler argue that treatment is a wide concept and prima facie means any measure applied 
to a particular person or persons.51 Domestic violence is also likely cruel and degrading. It has 
been suggested that cruel means the “intentional imposition of severe suffering.”52 Degrading 
has not been considered by the New Zealand courts. However, in the United Kingdom it has 
been held that degrading suggests “an assault on the dignity and physical integrity of an 
individual which humiliates and debases.”53 The inquiry into whether conduct is cruel or 
degrading would likely be intensely factual and depend on all relevant factors. Such approach 
                                                     
49 Tushnet, above n 46, at 1213-1217. 
50 A v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 611 (ECtHR). 
51 Butler and Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 35, at [10.9]. 
52 Taunoa v Attorney General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 (HC). 
53 Butler and Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 35, at [10.11]. 
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would be consistent with the approach already taken in domestic violence cases in New 
Zealand.  
I am unconvinced as to the strength of this argument. This is because of the clear refusal by the 
legislators to enact the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in such a way as to impose positive 
obligations on the state.54 As highlighted, domestic violence occurs between private individuals 
and was historically considered a private matter. Accepting that a right to be free from domestic 
violence could be read into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act would require recognition of 
positive obligations on the state to intervene and protect one private individual from domestic 
violence by another private individual.55 This approach would be contrary to Parliamentary 
intent. When the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was drafted the introduction of positive 
obligations was particularly feared.56 This is why economic, social and cultural rights were 
omitted from the Act.57 Enforcement of economic, social and cultural obligations would 
require enacting the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act as supreme law that the courts could use 
to hold state actors to account and strike down inconsistent action.58 The Justice and Law 
Reform Select Committee believed that this would allow too much power to unelected 
judges.59 Economic, social and cultural rights are not “value free” and the ramifications of 
“freezing” such substantive rights into “special constitutional status” were also feared.60 Again, 
this suggests that a right to be free from domestic violence cannot be read into the current New 
Zealand rights framework.  
This part concludes therefore that there is no recognised right to be free from domestic violence 
in New Zealand. In my view this is unsatisfactory. New Zealand should recognise freedom 
from domestic violence as a human right. The following part explores this.  
III New Zealand should Recognise a Right to be Free from Domestic 
Violence 
New Zealand should recognise a right to be free from domestic violence. In this part I argue 
that a human rights approach to domestic violence will strengthen the object of the existing 
                                                     
54 Opie, above n 43, at 476-477. 
55 Jan Stemplewitz “Horizontal rights and freedoms: an analysis of the role and effect of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 in private litigation” (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005) at 197-
198. 
56 Opie, above n 43, at 476-477. 
57 At 476-477. 
58 At 476-477. 
59 At 476-477. 
60 At 476-477. 
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domestic violence framework and signify the weighting that should be given to domestic 
violence policy as well as working to further empower women. In particular, I argue that human 
rights recognise an inherent right that a person is entitled to merely by virtue of their status as 
a human being. I also, in brief, question the soundness of human rights more generally. 
The underlying purpose of the Domestic Violence Act is to recognise that domestic violence 
in any form is unacceptable behaviour.61 Recognising domestic violence as a human rights 
issue will strengthen this purpose because human rights language indicates that the interest in 
question is of fundamental importance and “demands recognition”.62 A human right and rights 
discourse “elevates” the interest in question “above the arena of state law and into the realm of 
universal right.”63 Therefore, breach of a human right is no ordinary wrong.64 Geiringer and 
Palmer explain this by comparing rights with needs.65 They argue that rights emphasis 
entitlement and the particular aspects of the interests and duties at play.66 A right is a superior 
interest to a need. For example, Geiringer and Palmer provide the example: “John needs food” 
and argue the absence of rights language fails to indicate the moral or legal obligations of others 
in relation to John’s need. The phrasing “John has a right to food”, in contrast, connotes that 
someone else, for example the state, has a duty to ensure that John’s right to food is upheld.67  
Further, a human rights approach to domestic violence would ensure that the state prioritises 
domestic violence policy. “Rights” language indicates the importance and weighting that 
should be given to the interest.68 Rights impose significant duties therefore the interest must be 
“sufficiently compelling to justify the imposition of such duty on others.”69 A right to food, to 
continue Geiringer and Palmer’s example, means that the individual’s interest in food is of 
greater priority than other interests held by members of the community.70 John should therefore 
be allocated more resources than those in the community presenting ordinary needs.71 Again, 
this is because a human right is a superior interest to an ordinary legal right.72 
                                                     
61 Section 5 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
62 Martin Loughlin The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 126-127. 
63 At 128. 
64 At 126-127. 
65 Geiringer and Palmer, above n 29, at 14.  
66 At 14. 
67 At 14.  
68 At 14. 
69 At 14. 
70 At 14. 
71 At 14. 
72 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, above n 62 at 128-129. 
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A human rights approach to domestic violence would indicate that the state has recognised that 
domestic violence is an imperative social issue in need of immediate response as well as raising 
the priority status of domestic violence above other social concerns.73 Within social policy 
there is always tension. State resources are finite and allocation of such resources must be a 
zero sum game. The state must consider which issues should be prioritized and in what order. 
Issues of higher priority are, as would be expected, granted more resources. Framing the right 
to be free from domestic violence as a human right would ensure that present and future 
governments allocate more resources to domestic violence policies than to social issues that do 
not attach the same human rights status. The UPR recommendations show that the international 
community expects such positive action from New Zealand. The UPR recommended that New 
Zealand put in place, strengthen and allocate more resources to existing measures to combat 
domestic violence.74  
Human rights labelling is also important because it provides an educative function, that is, it 
will lead to greater community awareness about the right in question.75 Again, this is because 
the human rights “label” indicates the significance of the interest in question. Greater 
awareness will be influential in changing culture and raising the profile of domestic violence.76 
In New Zealand awareness of domestic violence has improved considerably in recent years yet 
greater awareness is still needed.77 Domestic violence is notably underreported, as stated 
almost 80 percent of all domestic violence incidents are not brought to the attention of the 
authorities.78 As discussed, this is because domestic violence is still considered a private issue 
that should remain behind closed doors. I believe that to reduce rates of domestic violence the 
public must become more aware of the atrocity that domestic violence is. Community discourse 
and action has in the past been responsible for major social reform.79 Shelton argues that human 
beings have an “innate desire to be protected from abuse” and the “ethical and moral 
dimension” of human rights law compels the use of human rights as a legal check on excessive 
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exercises of power.80 Accordingly, this “moral dimension” has inspired formation of human 
rights communities, in particular, non-government organisations who have worked to raise 
awareness of rights issues, worked to further develop rights discourse and have acted as 
“watchdogs and whistle-blowers” regarding human rights violations.81 A human rights label, 
or even discussion in the public arena regarding whether domestic violence should be a human 
rights issue, will bring domestic violence to the public’s attention once again and encourage 
public debate and condemnation of the issue.82 
Finally, framing domestic violence as a human rights issue will empower women. “The 
language of [human] rights is the language of empowerment.”83 This is because human rights 
labelling conceptualises the right bearer as self-sufficient, and independent, a holder of 
entitlements.84 This is important because domestic violence by its nature is flagrantly opposed 
to a sense of empowerment. Domestic violence is degrading, demeaning and strips women of 
power. Victims of domestic violence would therefore no longer be seen as passive and in need 
of charity but rather as equal and autonomous rights holders.85   
I would argue that, at present, ordinary legal remedies do little to give victims back such sense 
of power and dignity. Issues like domestic violence are often termed women’s rights issues 
which, according to Bunch, allows the state to dismiss women’s issues as less important than 
traditional human rights issues.86 Further, recourse to the law is often a last resort for women 
in domestic violence situations.87 One reason for this is that complainants of domestic violence 
often feel like they are disrupting normal; in some cultures and parts of society being powerless 
to men and a victim of domestic violence is inherent in being a women.88  A human rights 
approach would begin to undermine this as it would recognise a woman standing up for a state 
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of being that is rightfully and validly due to her.89 Ertürk argues that “applying a human rights 
perspective to violence has created a momentum for breaking the silence around violence and 
for connecting the diverse struggles across the globe.”90 This is because, as Loughlin writes, 
reliance on human rights is “essentially an appeal to some fundamental set of rights that inhere 
in the individual and demand recognition” whether or not the state or the public accept such 
recognition.91 
The arguments that have been advanced in this part are premised on a natural law justification 
for human rights. In brief, that human rights are legal entitlements that every human being 
without discrimination is entitled to merely because they are human. It is important to note that 
the way human rights are defined and the reason for defining the right in such a manner will 
determine how it is applied and how fundamental it is considered.   
It is near impossible to think and argue about human rights without being influenced by one’s 
personal worldview. I am influenced by an orthodox definition of human rights and this 
motivates my argument that domestic violence should be framed as a human rights issue in 
New Zealand. In my view, human rights validate the inherent worth and dignity of a person. 
Therefore, what better tool to utilise when attempting to remedy a social issue so clearly 
opposed to a woman’s dignity and worth? 
Natural law theory mandates that certain rights exist by dint of some “higher law” superior to 
positive or man-made law.92 Such higher law establishes universal and timeless rights that all 
human beings are entitled to and may make recourse to.93 John Locke’s famous enunciation 
that all free men have inalienable rights to life, liberty and property is evidence of early natural 
rights thinking.94 All human beings are equal and all deserve to be treated with dignity.95 
“Human dignity constitutes the intellectual centre of the entire culture of human rights.”96 
Human rights are the most important rights that a person may enjoy and should be given effect 
as such.97   
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There are problems with natural law justifications for human rights and history has shown 
natural law jurisprudence to come and go from accepted legal thinking.98 At present, two 
primary criticisms of natural rights are the fact that natural law rationales are often based on 
Judaeo-Christian thinking which is increasingly unpopular in a modern secular age and that the 
universality of human rights undermines cultural relativism and state sovereignty.99 These 
criticisms have led to rights discourse being positivized.100 In particular, the term “natural 
right” and the appeal to a higher power for justification have been rejected and replaced with 
“human right” and there has been a movement towards deriving justification for such rights 
from the mere fact that one is human.101 Raz explains this:102    
Human rights’ [are] those important rights which are grounded in our humanity. The underlying 
thought is that the arguments which establish that a putative right-holder has a human right rely 
on no contingent fact except law of nature, the nature of humanity and that the right holder is a 
human being. 
Again, such justification poses problems. Raz argues that scholars advancing a modern natural 
law justification rely on the concept of personhood or humanism.103 Yet, to achieve full 
personhood human rights must already exist.104 Such logic is flawed. It would suggest that 
those stripped of human rights, those enslaved or those who knowingly consent to their human 
rights being limited, for example, cannot obtain full status as a person. Raz argues;105 
The life of people so controlled or dominated may be better or worse as a result, but are those 
people really persons only to a lesser degree? I find it difficult to avoid the suspicion that 
[Griffin] is smuggling a particular ideal of a good life into his notion of being a person to the 
fullest degree. 
These criticisms are certainly valid arguments and may work to undermine the legitimacy of 
human rights as constraints on public power. As such, those who reject a natural law 
justification of human rights may balance the competing arguments for and against recognising 
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domestic violence as a human rights issue with different weight than suggested in this paper. 
For example, those who conceive of rights as rights deriving from God or the nature of 
humanity may give more weight to the enforcement of the right than those who conceive rights 
in a strictly positive sense.106 Likewise, whether human rights are conceived as a political or 
legal phenomena will affect the application of the right in a particular situation. This will be 
discussed in the following part. 
IV Problems with Recognising a Right to be Free from Domestic Violence  
Recognising a right to be free from violence is however no simple solution. The following part 
considers two problems that framing domestic violence as a human rights issue in New Zealand 
may pose. First, it is argued that a human rights approach is inappropriate because it seems that 
rights only have political value in New Zealand rather than value as legal causes of action. 
Secondly, it is argued that application of human rights to domestic violence would require 
positive action by the state and that such further state action may be inappropriate in the context 
of domestic violence.  
A A Political Approach to Rights in New Zealand 
Until this point the term “human right” has been used somewhat blindly without much 
explanation as to the legal status of the term. This section emphasises the contentious status of 
human rights. On one hand, human rights may be considered valid legal causes of action. Other 
laws and actions by legal persons are subject to compliance with human rights and legal forums 
are authorised to enforce such compliance. On the other hand, human rights may be merely 
political in nature. Compliance with human rights is a matter best determined within a political 
forum. This political-legal dichotomy comes originally from Professor Griffith’s work.107  
In brief, Griffith claimed that there is no such thing as legal rights. Rights are merely political 
claims framed as legal rights by individuals and groups. For example:108 
In this political, social sense there are no over-riding human rights. No right to 
freedom, to trial before conviction, to representation before taxation. No right not 
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to be tortured, not to be summarily executed. Instead these are political claims by 
individuals and by groups. 
Griffith had two main reasons for this argument. First, Griffith believed at a philosophical level 
that there is a continuous struggle between the rulers and the ruled about the size and shape of 
rights, interests and duties.109 This affects the way that law and politics develop.110 
Constitutions should reflect such tension between law and politics, yet recognise rights issues 
are “political throughout.”111 Constitutions should create political institutions in which 
individuals and governments can discuss these varying political claims.112 Secondly, Griffith 
believed that law was merely a form of politics.113 Law is not separate or superior to politics 
rather it is one way in which disputes can be discussed and resolved.114  
I would argue that Griffith’s claim is certainly relevant in society today, despite its age. Perhaps 
it is even more applicable than when Griffith first propounded his thesis given the modern 
rejection of a natural law justification of rights. In an increasingly secular society a political 
approach to rights is both pragmatic and reflective of reality.115 If human rights lack common 
religious or moral justification they are rendered without foundation.116 Lack of foundation 
undermines the legal value of the rights so proponents are compelled to justify rights on the 
basis of common politics.117 For example, Griffith’s view of human rights is consistent with 
the increasing number of rights claimed to be fundamental rights. Raz is particularly dubious 
of the legal nature of rights in a constitution where one can effectively claim “a right against 
poverty and a right to be loved,” a right “not to be exposed to excessively and unnecessarily 
heavily, degrading, dirty and boring work, “ a right to “globalisation” or a right to “sexual 
pleasure and comprehensive sexual education.”118 The constant evolution and creation of rights 
reflects the shifting of political values and resource allocation. Arguably, if rights were so 
fundamental and inherent then the substantive content of such rights would be finite and few.119  
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In relation to domestic violence in New Zealand, there is significant contention within New 
Zealand’s rights culture as to whether rights should be considered legal or political. I argue that 
New Zealand human rights culture aligns more closely with a political conception of human 
rights. However, it is important to note that ascertaining human rights culture or attempting to 
ascertain culture is an abstruse task. How does one measure and encapsulate something like 
culture which by its nature is vague and unscientific? Therefore, this section merely attempts 
to identify an indication of attitudes towards human rights. To do this several recent cases, state 
decisions and opinions of academics are considered. 
I The Judiciary 
There is some evidence of judges in New Zealand taking active steps to protect citizen rights. 
The longstanding purpose of judges is to protect the citizen by promoting and upholding 
individual rights.120 This was true before the introduction of formal legislation protecting 
human rights.121 Judges have a dual duty.122 On one hand they are required to interpret and 
enforce law of a sovereign parliament and on the other hand they are equally required to 
discharge their obligation to the citizen by ensuring that “the working of legislation is sensible, 
just and practical.”123 This traditional purpose would be consistent with upholding legal human 
rights. 
Judicial and extra-judicial writings of New Zealand’s Lord Cooke are consistent with the 
principle that judges are the bulwark against excessive state power.124 In Taylor v New Zealand 
Poultry Board Cooke J, as he was then, stated that some rights lie so deep that even a sovereign 
Parliament could not override them.125 This shows that at least one judge values an activist and 
legal approach to the protection of human rights. Lord Cooke indicates that the correct response 
to human rights breaches would be redress through the courts.126 A victim of rights abuse would 
be entitled to have his or her case heard before the court and the court would be mandated to 
stand between Parliament and the citizen and declare that such oppressive action by the state 
was contrary to fundamental tenets of law, in other words, human rights.127 However, Lord 
                                                     
120 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, above n 62, at 81. 
121 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2009) at 320. 
122 At 320. 
123 Burrows and Carter, above n 110, at 320. 
124 Claudia Geiringer “The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act” A Critical Examination of R v 
Hansen” in (Claudia Geiringer and Dean R Knight (eds) Seeing the World Whole: Essays in Honour of Sir 
Kenneth Keith (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2008) 69 at 81. 
125 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 (CA) at 398. 
126 Sir Robin Cooke “Fundamentals” (1988) NZLJ 158 at 164. 
127 At 164. 
Laws 522 Domestic Violence: Just a Matter for the Politicians? Emma Talbot 
 
22 
 
Cooke was referring to extremely serious human rights abuses, such as an attempt by the state 
to strip Jewish citizens of their citizenship.128 A situation of this gravity has never arisen in 
New Zealand and one can only speculate on how far the Judiciary would go in encroaching on 
parliamentary sovereignty if such a case were ever to arise. Further, the seemingly activist 
approach in favour of legal human rights advanced by Lord Cooke may not be indicative of 
judicial culture as a whole. Lord Cooke was writing at a time where there was significant 
concern about the absence checks on state power, in particular the absence of a Bill of Rights 
Act.129  
Regardless, there are cases that suggest some modern judges also take an active approach to 
validating the existence of legal human rights. In Ministry of Transport v Noort, for example, 
the Court of Appeal endorsed a generous interpretation to human rights issues, adopting Lord 
Wilberforce’s statement in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher that human rights require:130 
A generous interpretation avoiding what has been called the ‘the austerity of 
tabulated legalism’, suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms referred to. 
R v Poumako also validated the existence of legal human rights.131  The defendant’s right to a 
minimum standard of criminal procedure enshrined in s 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act was purportedly breached by the enactment of retrospective legislation. In order to protect 
such a fundamental human right the court read s 80(2A), the retrospective provision, as to only 
apply retrospectively to the date on which the amendments commenced.132 This interpretation 
was in patent opposition to parliamentary intent. The amendments introducing retrospective 
penalties were intended specifically as a response to Mr Poumako’s offending.133 The Court’s 
interpretation was rights friendly. Although the interpretation of s 80(2A) was significantly 
strained and contrary to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty the Court considered human 
rights more important. This suggests that human rights are valid legal safeguards against 
oppressive state power and can be effectively relied on by individuals in court.  
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The recent case Taylor v Attorney General also shows judicial willingness to recognise and 
protect legal human rights.134 This case concerned an amendment to the Electoral Act 1993 in 
2010 which prohibited all prisoners incarcerated after 16 December 2010 from voting in a 
General Election. Such amendment is contrary to fundamental electoral rights enshrined in s 
12 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.135 Taylor sought a declaration of inconsistency. Such 
remedy had never been granted by New Zealand Courts. However, Heath J asserted that the 
courts have a legal responsibility to “fashion public law remedies to respond to the wrong 
inherent in any breach of a fundamental right.”136 Such responsibility was not precluded from 
extending to wrongs committed by the Legislature.137 In fact, Heath J stated that the courts 
function “is to determine whether legislation is in breach of fundamental rights.”138 This 
statement again suggests that the judiciary is the appropriate legal protector of rights. Rights 
issues are not to be determined in the political arena. Victims of rights breaches are entitled to 
legal redress despite such redress appearing contrary to political sovereignty. 
These cases could be argued to be examples of the Judiciary actively protecting human rights 
as a matter of law. However, in my opinion it cannot be argued convincingly that these cases 
represent the culture of the judiciary as a whole. One or two judicial cases, albeit decisions 
considered emblematic human rights cases, may not accurately shed light on the attitude of the 
entire judiciary. I would argue that presenting these cases in support of clear legal protection 
of rights by the judiciary is too simplistic.  
First, the liberal and “rights friendly” approach of Heath J in Taylor v Attorney General may 
not be reflective of judicial attitudes across New Zealand. Only several years prior to Taylor, 
the Court of Appeal, in Boscawen v Attorney General seemed to take a political approach to 
human rights. The Court found that they could not make a declaration of inconsistency in the 
abstract although the door was tentatively left open for such a declaration in cases where there 
was a dispute.139 This led commentators to believe that it would be highly unlikely that New 
Zealand courts would ever make a declaration of inconsistency.140 Further, the Court stated 
that the appropriate forum for discussion of human rights implications was Parliament, in 
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particular through the s 7 function of the Attorney General, not the courts.141 For example, the 
Court said:142 
In an environment where there is room for genuine differences of view, we remind 
ourselves that Parliament entrusted the s 7 judgment and reporting obligation to the 
Attorney-General, not to the courts. [Emphasis added]. 
The function of the Attorney General will be discussed further shortly. For now though, the 
dicta in Boscawen suggests a reluctance to go against a political conception of rights. 
Therefore, Taylor could indicate a revival of judicial protection of rights and culture moving 
towards legal rights culture or it could indicate an anomaly. I suggest it indicates an anomaly. 
It is probable that other judges would not have been so ready to issue a declaration in favour 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act especially if following Boscawen. It will be interesting 
to see whether or not Heath J’s declaration is overturned on appeal.  
Secondly, Geiringer argues that courts will only treat human rights as a legal constraint on state 
power where the breach of the human right is sufficiently serious.143 This will depend on factors 
such as the nature of the breach and the clarity of parliamentary intent.144 The court when faced 
with human rights disputes is forced to choose between purpose and principle.145 I would 
suggest that this indicates a choice between political rights and legal rights. In the cases 
discussed the courts have deliberately strained the meaning of the relevant human rights 
provision to ensure the right at issue is upheld because they have considered the right in 
question sufficiently fundamental.146 I would argue that this shows human rights issues are 
permitted within the political jurisdiction only so long as political power does not stray from 
wide-reaching parameters guarded by the judiciary. This would suggest that the courts permit 
a political approach to rights but there is a threshold. Only when such threshold is crossed rights 
have valid legal standing.  
II The State 
I argue that the attitude of the state also reflects a political conception of rights. Arguments in 
favour of this are more apparent than arguments regarding the attitude of the judiciary. First, 
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the State’s response to Taylor v Attorney General indicates a political conception of rights. The 
State has rebuffed Heath J’s declaration of inconsistency. Ministry of Justice officials have 
publically stated that although the decision is being “considered” a declaration of inconsistency 
has no power to invalidate the legislation.147 This response is consistent with New Zealand’s 
constitutional approach to human rights. Domestic legislation passed by a sovereign Parliament 
is the ultimate authority and a declaration that the Electoral Act contravenes the right to vote 
does not render the offending provision invalid.148  
New Zealand’s legislative human rights structure may also point to a political conception of 
rights. New Zealand’s approach to human rights law has been ad hoc and arguably informal.149 
Our constitution is unwritten, that is, it is “discernible from a range of sources” and is not 
supreme law.150 Our dualist system means that international law, generally the origin for human 
rights ideals, is not directly enforceable in New Zealand unless incorporated into domestic 
law.151 
New Zealand’s primary rights protections are found in the Human Rights Act 1993 and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Yet, neither Act encapsulates specifically a right to be free 
from domestic violence despite the Human Rights Act providing extensive protections against 
discrimination. A number of grounds are established including, including discrimination due 
to sex, marital status, religious belief, race, disability, age, political opinion, employment 
status, family status and sexual orientation.152 The Human Rights Act primarily applies to 
private individuals, Part 2 sets out provisions prohibiting private individuals from 
discriminating against other private individuals. Part 1A provides a link mechanism between 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act, establishing a procedure for 
individuals to make complaints about discrimination from a public actor (covered by provisions 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act). Section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
prohibits discrimination on the any of the grounds identified in the Human Rights Act.  
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act incorporates New Zealand’s commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Legislature, Executive and 
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Judiciary and any other person or body that performs a public function, duty or power conferred 
by statute are bound to comply with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provisions unless non-
compliance can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.153 However, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is not entrenched and as noted the Judiciary has no power to 
strike down inconsistent legislation rendering the rights protections significantly weaker than 
perhaps ideal.154 The courts only have an interpretative function. They may interpret legislation 
as consistently as possible with the rights provisions but cannot override clear statutory 
wording.155  
Both the Human Rights Act and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act are considered part of the 
constitutional framework yet neither are entrenched nor able to be used by the judiciary to 
strike down laws that may be inconsistent with the rights prescribed.156 The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act also fails to provide an express remedies provision so remedies under the Act 
have been made available only through the ingenuity of the Judiciary.157 Therefore, despite the 
language of rights and the significance such rhetoric attaches, as discussed, the rights 
prescribed within New Zealand’s human rights framework have indistinguishable legal status 
from that of ordinary rights and obligations under statutes such as the Crimes Act 1961 or the 
Employment Relations Act 2000. This means that mechanisms purporting to uphold human 
rights in New Zealand are significantly lacking.158 I would argue that such framework suggests 
an unwillingness by political actors to give human rights full legal effect. The status of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act show a reluctance by the state to allow 
human rights to legally constrain political decisions.   
Despite limited legal accountability, a breach of human rights obligations would create a 
negative state image. However, this is political not legal accountability. The limited legal 
redress within New Zealand’s constitutional framework is in harmony with Griffith’s political 
conception of rights. Griffith argued that the political sphere is a legitimate forum for disputes 
and perhaps more suited to rights issues than the courts.159 This is because rights disputes, for 
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example disagreements regarding the bounds of the rights, the application of rights, the 
weighting and superiority of different rights and so forth, are inherently contentious and value-
laden.160 Allowing Judges to determine issues that have the potential to be politically divisive 
is inappropriate. Judges, because of their background education and training, make up a 
“strikingly homogenous collection of attitudes, belief and principles, which to them, represent 
the public interest.”161 Refusal to enact the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act or the Human 
Rights Act as supreme law ensures that disputes are constrained to the political arena.162 
Further, and as already noted in brief, the function of the Attorney General per s 7 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act points towards a political conception of human rights.  Section 7 
requires that the Attorney General bring to Parliament’s attention any provisions in proposed 
legislation that appear inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. This occurs on 
the introduction or as soon as practicable after the introduction of a bill to Parliament.163 This 
aspect of the parliamentary process ensures that human rights issues are discussed in the 
political arena.164 Once the Attorney General has brought potential human rights issues to 
Parliament’s attention Parliament is obliged to debate the issue and make a decision as whether 
or not it is acceptable to limit or undermine the right in question. Rishworth argues that the 
process ensures that there is “reasoned” discussion about potential rights breaches165. 
Parliament cannot legislate inconsistently with human rights obligations without deference to 
political debate.166 Therefore, the courts must respect Parliament’s ultimate decision even if 
the same decision would not be made by the courts.167 
Enactment of s 7 was a deliberate decision to entrust human rights compliance to a political 
actor rather than the courts.168 By the time an Act has been passed, even if it is contrary to 
fundamental human rights, it has been through a scrupulous democratic process and the courts 
should not undermine such process.169 Rishworth argues that the current political process 
ensures that legislation is of better quality because it enables human rights issues to be talked 
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about openly.170 Similarly, Hiebert argues that often human rights issues are matters of finely 
balanced opinions and the best forum for such contentious matters is a democratically elected 
Parliament.171 According to Hiebert s 7 “embodies the idea of political rights-vetting.”172 
Again, these arguments are consistent with Griffith’s desire for a political conception of rights.  
III Scholars  
Although I have argued that both the approach of the judiciary and the state suggest a political 
conception of rights this conclusion is not undisputable and there is certainly tension between 
a political and legal approach to rights. As suggested, the court may be permitting a political 
conception of rights only because Parliament has not made a decision that so severely breaches 
human rights. Such tension between the perceived judicial approach and political approach 
gives rise to the concept of dialogue which Petra Butler examines at length. This is the 
conversation between the courts and Parliament when a human rights issue is raised.173 By 
enacting human rights legislation Parliament has granted the court jurisdiction to grapple with 
human rights issues.174 The court is able to determine a human rights issue by identifying the 
breach and issuing guidance as to how such breach should be solved.175 Perhaps this suggests 
human rights are legal rights. Parliament seems to be recognising that rights have valid legality 
by requiring that the courts govern their application. However, the nature of the New Zealand 
rights framework lends itself to dialogue rather than traditional legal redress.176 In Joseph’s 
words, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is “an instrument of political rights review.”177 
Once a human rights breach is identified the court may make the state aware of such breach 
but ultimately redress is best suited to the state as the state is in the best position to have regard 
to political considerations.178 The importance of considering political considerations when 
determining a human rights dispute indicates that human rights may be considered political in 
nature in New Zealand.  
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Geddis also considers that “dialogue” points towards a political conception of rights. Geddis 
seems to suggest more strongly than Geiringer (see discussion under I Judiciary) and Butler 
that rights are considered mere political claims in New Zealand. For example, Geddis argues 
that dialogue is a telling feature of a parliamentary rights framework because it creates a culture 
of justification.179 Such justification is no more than a legal façade for a political decision.180 
Geddis states that the “provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act impose no more than 
a politico-moral, not legal, constraint on Parliament’s power to make law.”181 In fact, Geddis 
goes as far as to argue that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is irrelevant.182 Its ability to 
legally prevent the state from breaching rights is in Geddis’s opinion, “so minimal in nature as 
to be almost irrelevant.”183 Parliament has shown willingness to act inconsistently with human 
rights obligations and also a willingness to interpret rights in a manner most politically suited 
to their preferred decision.184 Geddis argues that this is because in general New Zealand 
constitutional culture is authoritarian, egalitarian and pragmatic.185 Such attributes suggest that 
it is not necessary to determine rights issues in court and this works to negate the legal faculty 
of rights. 
Butler and Butler consider the influence of international human rights law on rights disputes in 
New Zealand. Butler and Butler argue that the state has “deliberately chosen to under-
incorporate certain international obligations” and that this significantly limits the legal 
application of such obligations.186 Arguably such statement suggests that rights have a weak 
legal status in New Zealand.187 Although the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act does give effect 
to certain human rights it deliberately restricts recognition of other rights, in particular, 
economic, social and cultural rights. As these rights have not been incorporated into domestic 
law courts have limited ability to give effect to such rights.188 Therefore, although courts have 
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some ability to legally uphold rights ultimately such ability depends on a political decision by 
the state as to which rights deserve legal recognition. The ability to ensure legal protection of 
rights is delegated ability from a political decision. Again, this indicates that rights culture is 
primarily political. If rights were universal legal causes of action the judiciary would not be 
constrained in such a manner, they would have a duty to give effect to legal rights. I would 
argue that even the willingness of courts to apply the presumption of consistency is a strained 
attempt to get around a political conception of rights.189 
In contrast, Rishworth supports a legal conception of human rights. Rishworth argues that the 
purpose of a bill of rights or human rights act is to “take social and political issues and make 
them legal issues for judicial resolution.”190 He argues that courts should not “shy away” from 
interpreting human rights disputes in a legal manner.191 In fact, a legal approach is mandated 
by Parliament. The Human Rights Act explicitly allows declarations of inconsistency, a legal 
remedy.192 And, the Attorney General’s s 7 function is a legal function, albeit within a political 
process.193  Moreover, the contentious nature of human rights disputes does not negate a legal 
approach to the dispute.194 Rather, the legal test for inconsistency with human rights provisions 
must account for reasonable disagreement about the bounds and application of the right. This 
is certainly valid legal approach.195  
There is certainly tension between a legal and political conception of rights within New 
Zealand human rights culture and there are valid arguments in favour of both a political or legal 
conception of human rights. I argue that a political conception of rights appears to outweigh a 
legal conception of rights. I am persuaded by the argument that although human rights do have 
recognised legal standing through the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the Human Rights Act 
and through judicial interpretation such legal standing is limited and there is clear indication 
that rights disputes should remain within the political arena. The next section addresses the 
implications of this conclusion, that is, that New Zealand tends to view rights as political claims 
rather than legal claims. 
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B Implications of a Political Approach to Rights in New Zealand  
It could be argued that a political conception of human rights will not provide adequate redress 
for victims of human rights abuses, as compared with a legal conception of human rights. In 
particular, a political approach to the right to be free from domestic violence may be 
inappropriate for those most vulnerable or at risk of domestic violence. The following section 
gives reasons for this. 
First, as discussed a political approach to human rights means that judges are reluctant to hold 
the state to account for human rights breaches. A political conception of rights holds that the 
political sphere is the appropriate forum for human rights disputes.196 The current legal 
framework for dealing with human rights issues is far from perfect. Access to justice for 
vulnerable groups in society is already a significant issue. Court costs and legal aid thresholds, 
backlogged courts and the length of time it takes for cases to be resolved, fear of an intrusive 
and adversarial system and a blunt Eurocentric approach to issues across all cultural groups 
already create significant hurdles for those seeking redress for domestic violence.197 However, 
it is difficult to envisage how a political remedy would pose greater solutions.  It would likely 
be difficult for victims of domestic violence to access a political forum. Victims may lack to 
confidence or resources to access Members of Parliament or advocacy groups, victims may not 
wish to bring their stories of domestic violence to the public fore.  
Secondly, a political remedy for human rights issues would undermine a fair and objective 
response. Democratic politics so often becomes a politics of the majority.198 In New Zealand 
this is especially true given the Executive’s dominance in Parliament (despite the Mixed 
Membership Proportional system).199 Therefore, those responsible for providing political 
redress may be prevented from acting impartially for fear of offending the majority and losing 
voter support. Redress would be determined by majority views. This is problematic because 
human rights issues are so often controversial and contrary to the majority standpoint. This 
argument is particularly problematic when considering a right to be free from domestic 
violence. Although it can be argued that gender is the primary risk factor for domestic violence; 
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statistics show that domestic violence is most prevalent within lower socio-economic and 
Maori and Pacific communities.200 A political approach may not take into account needs of 
these vulnerable groups.  
These above two arguments have considered the ramifications of a political approach to 
freedom from domestic violence in the abstract. It is unclear how a political right to be free 
from domestic violence would operate in practice in New Zealand. It may require formation of 
advocacy groups who worked to bring domestic violence policy before Parliament. It may 
require individual Members of Parliament to advocate on behalf of domestic violence victims 
within their constituencies. It may require public discussion of domestic violence issues. It 
would not, however, negate the status quo. Recognising a right to be free from domestic 
violence, as a matter of politics, would not invalidate the Domestic Violence Act or preclude 
ordinary legal redress for domestic violence.  
Therefore, I argue that even though a political conception of a right to be free from domestic 
violence may not bring about radical changes to domestic violence policy and allow the court 
to hold the state legally accountable for domestic violence it would still be a positive approach 
to domestic violence. This is for the reasons already stated. A political conception of a right to 
be free from domestic violence will still have significant symbolic value and will bring 
domestic violence as an issue generally to the public fore which will create public awareness 
and discussion. These are positive ramifications. Such publicity will mean that advocacy and 
community groups will be strengthened as they will have greater political standing and the state 
will be encouraged to act consistently with a right to be free from domestic violence through 
democratic accountability. 
C Effect of Positive Obligations  
Recognising a right to be free from domestic violence would impose positive obligations on 
the state.201 This is problematic because at present New Zealand human rights framework does 
not impose positive obligations and, as discussed, this was a deliberate decision.202 The State 
did not want to be held to account regarding the efficacy of the discharge of such obligations 
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by an unelected and inferior court.203 Again, this is consistent with a political conception of 
human rights. Nevertheless, the following section considers whether recognition of positive 
obligations would be valuable in the context of domestic violence. First positive obligations 
and their scope are considered in general. Then, it is asked whether requiring the state to take 
positive steps to prevent domestic violence would provide greater protection for victims of 
domestic violence. 
Positive obligations denote a state’s duty to “undertake specific affirmative tasks” or take 
positive action to uphold human rights obligations.204 For example, the state may be required 
to investigate an incident, protect certain vulnerable persons, provide access to justice or enact 
specific legislation.205 Positive obligations can be compared with negative or defensive rights 
which are rights of the individual that limit the powers of the state but do not require the state 
to take positive action.206 Defensive rights, however, impose a duty on the state to “refrain from 
infringing them.”207 
It is generally accepted that recognising a right to be free from domestic violence would impose 
positive obligations on the state.208 However, it is unclear how wide the scope of such 
obligations would be regarding freedom from domestic violence especially if the reluctance in 
New Zealand to draft the Bill of Rights Act in a way that imposes positive obligations is taken 
into account.209 This issue would need resolving if New Zealand were to enact a right to be 
free from domestic violence. The efficacy of the right will depend on the scope of the 
obligations and the degree to which the court can hold the state accountable.  Scope is 
considered now.  
On one hand positive obligations may be limited to the enactment of legislation dealing with 
the right in question. This was case in A v United Kingdom. The state was held to have failed 
to discharge the required positive obligation to uphold the right to be free from domestic 
violence by failing to legislate against corporal punishment.210 Once the state has enacted 
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legislation that purports to uphold the human right in question the state has discharged its 
positive obligation.  
If positive obligations were limited in this manner then no difference would be made to rates 
of domestic violence in New Zealand. This is because New Zealand’s Domestic Violence Act 
is considered to be one of the best legislative regimes addressing domestic violence.211 It is 
comprehensive and wide-reaching, domestic violence in all forms is considered unacceptable 
behaviour and domestic violence takes a wide meaning, going further than physical abuse and 
including psychological abuse.212 Moreover, enforcement actors are equipped with ample 
remedies, police can instantly respond to domestic violence by issuing a police safety order 
and Judges have a wide discretion to consider all relevant factors when making a protection 
order.213 As well, Judges have a statutory duty to compel perpetrators to attend stopping 
violence programmes and to make victims aware of safety programmes.214 Yet New Zealand 
still has one of the highest rates of domestic violence in the developed world. Fenrich and 
Contesse state:215  
Over the last decade, New Zealand has made significant efforts to address an acute 
social problem-violence against women….In an effort to combat the problem, New 
Zealand has enacted legislation and regulations which aim to prevent and eliminate 
violence…nonetheless the levels of domestic violence remain surprisingly high. 
An explanation for why this is the case is complex and goes beyond the scope of this paper.216 
However, two problems with the current domestic violence framework are considered in brief. 
These problems are lack of enforcement of provisions and requirements under the Domestic 
Violence Act and limited ability to access legal protection for domestic violence incidents. I 
argue that extending the scope of the state’s positive obligations in regards to a right to be free 
from domestic violence would work to remedy these issues. 
Regarding enforcement, police action in response to domestic violence has been extensively 
criticised. There have been reports of police failing to take action when called to a domestic 
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violence incident because of the “good reputation” of the perpetrator or because police 
seemingly “could not be bothered” or did not view domestic violence as a priority,217 and there 
are also concerns that once a protection order has been issued police fail to adequately enforce 
the order. Fenrich and Contesse noted that:218 
…when protection orders are not granted or served on respondents in a prompt 
manner, there is a failure to protect victims of domestic violence as intended. 
Similarly, when respondents who fail to observe protection orders are not 
sanctioned, not only are women put in danger; the whole system that has been put 
in place to prevent and eliminate domestic violence is undermined. We observed 
different problems with protection orders, including failure to serve protection 
orders [and] lack of enforcement of protection orders. 
Access to justice also hinders victims’ ability to obtain redress for domestic violence. 
Robertson found that “there are too many hurdles to getting a protection order.”219 Such hurdles 
include the high threshold for obtaining legal aid and the high cost of a protection order if such 
threshold is not met, lack of experienced lawyers taking domestic violence cases and lack of 
support for immigrant women.220 Further, many women feel forced to self-represent and this 
also undermines access to justice.221 
I argue that these issues may be mitigated if New Zealand’s positive obligations were not 
limited to the mere enactment of domestic violence legislation (as such obligation has prima 
facie been discharged) but extended much further. Fenrich and Contesse argue that positive 
obligations require the state to act with due diligence to prevent rights violations.222 Due 
diligence is a broad concept and would require the state to take active steps to investigate and 
punish acts of violence and provide adequate compensation for victims in addition to enacting 
and maintaining a prohibitive legislative framework.223 Fenrich and Contesse’s definition of 
due diligence is consistent with CEDAW obligations. Article 4 of CEDAW mandates that sates 
must exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and in accordance with national legislation, 
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punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state or by 
private persons.224  
Considering the pertinent issues in New Zealand, lack of enforcement and access to justice, 
due diligence would mean that the state must take active steps to counter such issues. For 
example, the state would have to ensure actors such as police, public officials, and lawyers 
receive appropriate training regarding best practice response to domestic violence. At present, 
this is not occurring. There is an “absence of coherent and robust training policies” and training 
that does go forward is “patchy…and not good.”225  
Moreover, due diligence would allow for greater scrutiny of agency failings in response to 
domestic violence incidents. For example, if it were found that police failed to appropriately 
respond to a domestic violence incident then the state would be required to provide redress to 
the victim to account for police shortcomings. Such sanction would mean that the state has 
greater interest in the workings of the domestic violence legal regime on the ground and this 
would incentivise the actions such as further allocation of resources and greater investment in 
training programmes.  
Due diligence would also require that further resources be put into domestic violence policy. 
This could be allocation of resources into further research around domestic violence, at present 
the lack of empirical data around domestic violence has been criticised. It would require 
strengthening and extending stopping violence and safety programmes for those at risk of 
domestic violence.226 Research has shown that although legislation mandates that perpetrators 
of domestic violence attend non-violence programmes follow through does not always occur, 
non-attendance and non-completion are common.227 
These arguments suggest that recognising a right to be free from domestic violence and the 
resulting positive obligations on the state to act with due diligence would provide much greater 
redress for victims of domestic violence than the status quo. Ertürk argues that a due diligence 
standard “provides a framework for action” which can be used to hold the state to account as a 
matter of law.228 However, positive action of the kind discussed may not be the most 
appropriate action within the context of domestic violence. Domestic violence occurs across 
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all strata of society but is particularly prominent within Māori and Pacific families.229 Our 
current western legal approach to due diligence would likely only promote further police action 
and state intervention.230 It is foreseeable that increasing the responsibility of the state would 
lead to an increase in arrests, prosecutions and the removal of children from their families as 
these are the current means by which the state intervenes in domestic violence situations.231 
Such means may not be the most appropriate means of addressing domestic violence. Police 
action can be blunt and coercive and short term measures have little effect on preventing future 
violence.232 For example, “arrest may enrage the abusive man, spurring him to seek revenge 
against his partner-thus creating separation, but not safety…”233 Prosecution and conviction 
also raises this risk.234 Imprisonment for domestic violence offences is rare and perpetrators 
are likely to return to their communities “angry about their exposure to criminal liability.”235 
This would only damage the family unit and undermine the already precarious relationships. 
These arguments may seem to oppose recognition of positive obligations in regards to domestic 
violence. However, I would argue that the concerns around further state intervention in 
domestic violence situations do not sufficiently rebut arguments in favour of recognising a right 
to be free from domestic violence. Instead they merely highlight issues that the state will need 
to carefully consider when deciding how best to exercise the requirements of due diligence. A 
careful and sensitive approach to positive obligations will not create the problems outlined. In 
fact, due diligence requires a careful and sensitive approach to domestic violence issues. For 
example, if the state chose to take action that it  knows is likely to create further tension then 
such action is not an exercise of due diligence. If the state knows that increased arrest and 
removal of children is not the best approach to domestic violence then the state cannot be found 
to have discharged its positive obligations if this is the course of action it takes.  
Due diligence will therefore require a creative response to domestic violence. The state must 
carefully consider the failings of the current domestic violence policy and look for alternative 
solutions. Detailed considerations of what such solutions would be are outside the scope of this 
paper. However, in brief I believe that the state should look to alternative dispute resolution 
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mechanisms. In particular, the state should consider a “ground up” or restorative justice 
approach to domestic violence and ways in which at risk communities can be empowered in 
order to minimise the blunt and coercive approach that is the status quo.236 Likewise, Gormley 
argues that due diligence requires a commitment to addressing social issues that underlie 
domestic violence rates, issues such as poverty, gender inequality, inadequate housing and 
financial benefits for vulnerable women and intersectional discrimination.237 An approach such 
as this, albeit prima facie involving less state intervention, would still discharge the positive 
obligations that the right to be free from domestic violence requires. Ertürk argues that due 
diligence entails “tackling the root causes of the problem at all levels, from the home to the 
transnational arena.”238  
This conception of due diligence would enhance the claim that recognising a right to be free 
from domestic violence will empower women and denounce the degrading and demeaning 
nature of domestic violence. A broad conception of what positive obligations entail, that is, 
that positive obligations go further than negative protection, changes state focus from regarding 
women as victims to empowering them.239 As discussed, empowerment of women is one of 
the main reasons for recognising a right to be free from domestic violence. In my opinion this 
shows that a human rights approach to domestic violence is appropriate despite possible 
implications of imposing positive obligations on the state.  
V Conclusion 
The underlying question I have grappled with is whether recognising a human right to be free 
from domestic violence will provide greater redress for victims of domestic violence. As stated 
throughout, New Zealand has one of the highest rates of domestic violence in the developed 
world and this social issue is considered our most significant human rights failing. The starting 
point for this paper was the 2014 Universal Periodic Review which showed that New Zealand 
was not meeting international expectations regarding promotion of human rights, in particular 
the right to be free from violence.  
To begin, I asked whether it could be found that there is a right to be free from domestic 
violence in New Zealand. I concluded that there was no such right. Freedom from domestic 
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violence is excluded from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act and 
policy reasons mean that such a right cannot be convincingly read into either instrument.  
I argued that this status quo was insufficient given the atrocity of domestic violence that is so 
prevalent in New Zealand. Freedom from domestic violence should be recognised as a human 
right. Such argument stems from a natural law conception of human rights, that is, that all 
human beings are equal and deserving of dignity. Human rights are the way in which such 
dignity is validated. A human rights approach to domestic violence would symbolise the 
atrocity of the social issue, raise greater public awareness of the issue, ensure the issue is 
considered a political priority and empower women. 
There are two problems that recognising a right to be free from domestic violence in New 
Zealand would pose. First, it was suggested on the basis of Griffith’s argument that rights are 
mere political claims and as such a right to be free from violence would make little difference 
in reality. This is because it seems that New Zealand’s rights culture is consistent with 
Griffith’s theory. Rights tend to be treated as mere political claims rather than valid legal causes 
of action. This is because New Zealand’s constitutional structure, in particular the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act, gives human rights limited legal power. 
Ultimately the legal power of rights stems from political will.  
Secondly, I argued that recognising a right to be free from violence would result in imposing 
positive obligations on the state to intervene in domestic violence situations. The scope of what 
such positive obligations would be was discussed and it was argued that a broad interpretation 
requiring the state to act with due diligence would be most effective in reducing domestic 
violence rates. It was noted that further state intervention may only aggravate domestic 
violence in New Zealand. However, it was concluded that due diligence would require a careful 
and sensitive approach to further state intervention.  
These problems, a political conception of rights and difficulty with state intervention are valid. 
However, they do not outweigh the value of recognising a right to be free from violence. 
Although a human rights approach will not radically remedy the issue of domestic violence in 
New Zealand even a political conception of a right to be free from domestic violence will go 
some way to recognise and promote the idea that all women deserve to live a life free from 
violence. Such public enunciation is sufficiently important to recognise a right to be free from 
domestic violence even if such right only will only have political value.  
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